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Al~a'act~We r formulate and develop the concept of cooperative equilibrium discussed earlier by 
this author. 
In this short paper we reformulate and develop the concept of cooperative quilibrium, 
which was introduced in Ref. [1]. 
In order to study the problem of existence in an arbitrary but finite game we prove the 
following result. 
Consider a continuous real function 
@:ExY-,~ 
defined on a convex and compact non-empty subset Y. of a Euclidean space. 
Theorem 1. If, for each a 6 ~. 
~(. ,~) 
is concave in the first variable, then there exists a point a ~ E such that 
~(~, ~) ~> 4,(#, e) 
for each # e Y. 
Proof. Given the function ~b, consider the set 
z~ = {3 ~z:  ~ (3, ~)/> 4, (~, ~) v ~}. 
This set is convex since the function ~b is concave in the first variable. Then ~ determines 
a multivalued correspondence in the convex compact set ~ having the graph G closed on 
account of the continuity of the function ~. Therefore, by Kakutani's fixed-point theorem 
we have proved the existence of a fixed point 
For such point we have that 
q~(e, a) > ~(~, e) 
for each a ~ 2:. Q.E.D. 
By applying this general result we are in a position to show the existence of a cooperative 
equilibrium. 
Let us consider an n-persons game, 
r = {Yi, Ai; i ~ W} 
with all the strategy sets being finite. The mixed extension 
f = {£,, z,; i ~ w} 
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has a cooperative quilibrium zE ~7~ x • • • x E;., if given any continuous function 
q~:~l x . . . x~- - ,Z ,  x . . . .  xE,_ l  xE~_I x . . . xY  
we have that for any player i @ .,~', 
E,[~,, q'(2)] I> Ei[x,, q'(e)] 
for any x i~ i ,  where :?i = n~(2) and re, is the natural projection. 
We now prove an existence result. 
Theorem 2. For any finite n-persons game, there always exists a cooperative 
equilibrium. 
Proof .  Given a finite n-persons game and any continuous function q~, consider the 
function 
f~, (z) - 
~i'" " '  "1¢ i -  I" lri + l  . . . .  )l~n 
and 
Ai ( ' c t ,  • • • , "t'i- I, °'i, "ci+ t, • • • , "on) 
x q i ( z ) ( r  i . . . . .  r i - t ,  r , . t  . . . . .  z~) = Ei[o-~, qi(z)] 
f ,(z) = Y, f~, (:), 
i~,)" 
where 
and z e J~. 
Consider all the points 
O- =(a ,  . . . . .  O -n)eZ= X Z i  
where the function involved is 
4, (e, z)  = Y. L (z )  e(o-, . . . . .  O-,), 
by the previous theorem there exists a cooperative point such that 
e ~ Y.(2) 
or equivalently, 
(e, e) >/,~ (z, -)  
for any z. In particular, we have that for z, such that 
=j(z) = =j(e) = .~j 
for j #- i and 
hi(z) ~ =,(z') = .~,, 
the condition 
E~[.~,, q~(2)] >t Ei[x,, q'(e)] 
is satisfied for any xi e J~. 
Such point is a cooperative quilibrium. Q.E.D. 
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